En este ar tícu lo el au tor ar gu men ta que la au sen cia de una ex pli ca ción ade cua da de la le gis la ción al in te rior de la teo ría del de re cho, jun to con la fal ta de le gis la do res y de las le gis la tu ras en el dis cur so fi lo só fi co-ju rí di co, crea -y for ta le ce-la pre sun ción de que la ad ju di ca ción, los jue ces y los tri bu na les son cen tra les al en ten di mien to del de re cho. Por tan to, pre ten de no sólo equi li brar la re la ción en tre le gis la ción y ad ju di ca ción, al re que rir que am bos cum plan los mis mos es tán da res de cohe ren cia y con sis ten cia, pre dic ción y acep ta bi li dad, ra cio na li dad y ob je ti vi dad, sino tam bién ex plorar las for mas y los lí mi tes de la le gis la ción, al cues tio nar des de el pun to de vis ta del cons ti tu cio na lis mo la idea de que la le gis la ción como una ac tivi dad so be ra na está com ple ta men te li bre de lí mi tes.
Com mon sense tells us that there must be a dis tinc tion be tween a law and a good law, and at first glance pos i tiv ism seems am ply jus tified in rest ing its whole case on the self-ev ident qual ity of this dis tinc tion. But we must re mem ber that those dis tinc tions which seem too ob vi ous to re quire anal y sis are of ten precisely those which will not stand anal y sis. Com mon sense tells me that there is a clear dis tinc tion be tween a thing"s be ing a steam en gine and its be ing a good steam en gine. Yet if I have a du bi ous as sem blage of wheels, gears, and pis tons be fore me and I ask, "Is this a steam en gine?" it is clear that this inquiry over laps might ily with the ques tion: "Is this a good steam en gine?" In the field of purpos ive hu man ac tiv ity, which in cludes both steam en gines and the law, value and be ing are not two dif fer ent things, but two as pects of an in te gral re al ity.
Lon. L. FULLER, The Law in Quest of It self, 1940.
SUMMARY: I. In tro duc tion: An Im bal ance be tween Ad ju di cation and Leg is la tion? II. Legisprudence: The Theory and Prac tice of Leg is la tion. III. The Forms and Lim its of Leg is la tion. IV. Con clu sion:
The Quest for a Bon Législateur.
I. INTRODUCTION: AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN ADJUDICATION AND LEGISLATION?
Lev el ing the le gal play ing field does not im ply chang ing the tra di tional judge-ori ented ap proach to law with a leg is lator-ori ented at ti tude, but com ple ment ing them, in stead. In fact, the ab sence of an ad e quate the ory of leg is la tion within le gal the ory, jointly with the lack of leg is la tors and of leg is -248 la tures in ju ris pru den tial dis course cre ates the pre sumption -and even the ob ses sion-that ad ju di ca tion, judges, and courts are what law is all about. In ad di tion, leg is la tion is con sid ered rather a mat ter of po lit i cal the ory and, as such, an ob ject of study not for le gal schol ars but for po lit ical sci en tists, as a pre-law ma te rial.
In that sense, ju ris pru dence tends to fo cus ex clu sively on the judicative side of the law whereas the leg is la tive trait has not been prop erly taken care of by it. With such an imbal ance there is in deed a call to re dress two things: the one-sid ed ness in fa vor of a the ory of ad ju di ca tion, re-charac ter ized as "judicativeprudence", and the un even ness regard ing the treat ment of a the ory of leg is la tion, re-con sidered as "legislativeprudence".
For that pur pose we must first re call that we had char acter ized the lat ter -the the ory (and prac tice) of leg is la tionas "legisprudence", which in cluded among its fea tures the study of law mak ing and of laws, as well as the sur vey of leg is la tors and leg is la tures, i.e. what the leg is la tive agents or leg is la tors do and can not do in the leg is la tive fo rum or leg is la ture. Now, in this pa per our main aim is to ex plore a la Lon L. Fuller the forms and lim its of leg is la tion. There fore, we intend not only to rebalance its re la tion ship to ad ju di ca tion, by meet ing the same stan dards of co her ence and con sistency, pre dict abil ity and ac cept abil ity, ra tio nal ity and objec tiv ity, but also to chal lenge from the point of view of constitutionalism the idea that leg is la tion as a sov er eign activity is completely limit-free.
In do ing so we must ex plic itly say that both the so-called im plicit laws of law mak ing -gen er al ity, pub lic ity, irretroac tiv ity or prospectivity, clar ity, non-con tra dic tory, pos si bility, con stancy, and con gru ity-and the pro hi bi tions to which a leg is la ture is sub jected, such as abridg ing free dom of speech, in cluded in the First Amend ment of the United States Con sti tu tion; and ma ture prin ci ples sim i lar to those of lawfinding, and other lim its to what a leg is la ture can and 249 can not do or de cide. For ex am ple, "audi alteram partem", i.e. "let no one be a judge in its own cause" and en forc ing the cor re spond ing anal o gous "let no one be a leg is la tor in its own cause", as em bod ied in the XXVII Amend ment of the United States Con sti tu tion: "No law, vary ing the com pen sation for the ser vices of the Sen a tors and Rep re sen ta tives, shall take ef fect, un til an elec tion of Rep re sen ta tives shall have intervened."
II. LEGISPRUDENCE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION
To cut a re ally long story short, let me start by say ing that "legisprudence" is char ac ter ized as "the the ory -and prac tice-of leg is la tion". How ever, as the term "leg is la tion" is not free from a pro cess-re sult am bi gu ity, we must clar ify that legisprudence com prises the study, on the one hand, of the "leg is la tive pro cess or law mak ing", and, on the other hand, of the "leg is la tive re sult or laws". As legisprudence im plies the "the ory -and prac tice-of law mak ing and of laws", it also con tains the sur vey of "leg is la tors and leg is latures". 1 It is also worth clar i fy ing that by "law-mak ing" and by "laws" I mean, on one side, any leg is la tive pro cess, and, on the other, any leg is la tive re sult. Al though, I will re fer mostly to the nar rower sense of "leg is la tion" as en acted by leg is lators in leg is la tures, re gard less of their ac tual name such as de cree, edict, law, or di nance, reg u la tion, stat ute, and so on. I am not rul ing out the pos si bil ity of us ing "leg is la tion" in a broader sense to re fer to any leg is la tive pro cess or leg is lative re sult. This sense could in clude the ac tion of par ents that as sume the role of leg is la tors to set some fun da men tal prin ci ples and/or ground rules for their chil dren all the way to the draft ing of a Con sti tu tion and its amend ments or re forms, the cel e bra tion by the ex ec u tive and rat i fi ca tion of (in ter na tional) trea ties by the Sen ate, ex ec u tive agreements by Con gress, ex ec u tive reg u la tions and ju di cial agree ments, as long as their in tended out come is to serve as a general, abstract, impersonal and permanent direction or guideline of conduct.
More over, leg is la tion, leg is la tors and leg is la tures have in spite of ev ery thing a "bad name" in le gal and po lit i cal philos o phy as Jeremy Waldron points out, 2 and are still consid ered the "poor cous ins" of le gal ed u ca tion as A. Mi chael Froomkin puts it. 3 In fact, the ab sence of an ad e quate theory of leg is la tion, jointly with the non ap pear ance of leg is lators and the nonattendance of leg is la tures, cre ates the presump tion that ad ju di ca tion, judges and courts are what law is all about. 4 Par a dox i cally, the least dan ger ous branch of gov ern ment is the more -and ar gu ably better-ex am ined, mean while the most dan ger ous one is the less -and pre sum ably worse-stud ied, at least from the le gal per spec tive. 5 One of the very few and great ex cep tions is due to late pro fes sor Norberto Bobbio, who in the pro ceed ings of the IVR World 251 LEGISPRUDENCE: THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF LEGISLATION Con gress on "Le gal Rea son ing" cel e brated in Brussels, in 1971, pub lished an ar ti cle on the im age of the bon législateur. In that pa per, he dis tin guished not only be tween es sen tial and non-es sen tial at trib utes of a (good) leg is la tor, but also be tween two ide als in op po si tion. 6 On the one hand, he stip u lated that "es sen tial at trib utes" are those nec es sary pro hi bi tions that the leg is la tor can not vi o late, with out ex cep tions (as im per a tives); and, "non-essen tial at trib utes" are those con tin gent -not nec es sarythat may un der cer tain con di tions in sti tute pro hi bi tions to the leg is la tor with ex cep tions (as di rec tives). There fore, he es tab lished that the for mer -es sen tial at trib utes-included the fol low ing: 1) jus tice: equal treat ment to that alike and dif fer ent treat ment to those un like; 2) co her ence: no (log i cal) con tra dic tions; 3) ra tio nal ity: in the for mal-log i cal or in trin sic sense of zweckrationalität -a la Max Weber; and 4) non-re dun dancy: no rep e ti tion or un nec es sary re it er ation. Whereas, the lat ter -non-es sen tial at trib utes-comprise the sub se quent: 1) rig or ous: scru pu lous in the pro cess of law-mak ing; 2) sys tem atic: me thod i cal in the or der of expo si tion; and 3) ex haus tive: com plete ness in the de ter mi nation of spe cific cases. In con se quence, he as sumes a nec essary just, co her ent, ra tio nal, and non-re dun dant leg is la tor, and pre sumes a con tin gent rig or ous, sys tem atic and exhaus tive legislator.
On the other hand, he stated as a gen eral rule the ideal of the bon législateur and the juge loyal; and, as the ex ception the ideal of the bon législateur com ple mented by the bon juge, in the sense of the well-known bon juge Magnaud:
Dans ce cas, un contraste existe en tre l'idéal du bon législateur et celui du juge loyal (idéal non moins con stant et non moins persistant) dont la tâche est d'appliquer le droit établi et non de créer un droit nou veau. Dans cette op po sition, le sec ond idéal l'emporte en général sur le pre mier. On 252 IMER B. FLORES peut exprimer cette priorité en ces termes: en certains cas extrêmes, mieux vaut admettre que soit affaiblie l'image du bon législateur plutôt que d'accepter le prin cipe du bon juge, au sens du bon juge Magnaud, c'est-à-dire du juge qui prend la place du législateur.
Al though I am very sym pa thetic to his work, in gen eral, and to this piece, in par tic u lar, for be ing the first and -for a long time-al most the one and only, to ad dress these issues re gard ing the (good) leg is la tion, leg is la tor and leg is lature, I will start by crit i ciz ing his ac count. Be sides some other mi nor points, my ma jor crit i cism is that this ac count fails by con sid er ing the ide als of juge loyal and bon juge as in com pat i ble ones, when a char ac ter is tic of a good judge seems to be being a loyal judge.
Clearly the prob lem is: loyal to what? 7 The tar geted concep tion em bed ded in "le gal ism" con sid ers that the judge is -and must be-loyal to the (good) leg is la tor, who cre ated the gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent laws to be ap plied im par tially, and that as an ex cep tion be comes a bon juge when he/she takes the place of the bon législateur in or der to leg is late in ter sti tially. All this loy alty -and defer ence-from the judge to the leg is la tor as sumes that the lat ter is just, co her ent, ra tio nal-rea son able, and non-redun dant. It even pre sumes that it is also rig or ous, sys tematic and ex haus tive in its for mu la tions, and spe cially presup poses that law-mak ing is a sov er eign ac tiv ity com pletely free or lim it less, with the Latin ad age Quod principi placuit 253 vigorem legis habet ("What ever pleases the prince has the force of law") as the fam ily motto. 8 On the con trary, the al ter ative con cep tion em bod ied in "constitutionalism" con sid ers that the judge is -and must be-loyal to the (good) leg is la tor, as long as the leg is la tor does not vi o late the pro hi bi tions re lated not only to Bobbio's "es sen tial and non-es sen tial at trib utes of the bon législateur" but also to Fuller"s "im plicit laws of law mak ing", those identi fied as the in ter nal mo ral ity of law: "gen er al ity", "pub lic ity", "irretroactivity" or "prospectivity", "clar ity", "non-con tra dicto ri ness", "pos si bil ity", "con stancy" and "con gru ity", 9 which we are go ing to re-char ac ter ize as "the le gal ra tio nal ity of (good) leg is la tion" and re-de velop as "the forms and lim its of (good) leg is la tion", in clud ing ac cord ing to "constitutionalism" the re spect for hu man rights and sep a ra tion of pow ers (ar ticle 16 of the French Dec la ra tion of the Rights of Men and Cit i zen): "Tout societé dans laquelle la garantie des droits n'est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs déterminée, n'a point de con sti tu tion".
My hunch is that the ab sence of an ad e quate the ory of leg is la tion within le gal the ory, jointly with the lack of anal ysis and dis cus sion about leg is la tors and leg is la tures in juris pru dence cre ates the pre sump tion that ad ju di ca tion, judges, and courts are what law is all about. In that sense it is nec es sary to level the le gal play ing field. Let me in sist that it does not im ply chang ing the tra di tional judge-oriented ap proach to law with a leg is la tor-ori ented at ti tude, but com ple ment ing them, in stead. 254 In or der to ad vance the ar gu ment for legisprudence, my tar get has been "le gal ism" and my al ter na tive scheme "constitutionalism". In sum, I am against the for mer because it adopts a rigid sep a ra tion of pow ers and fails to pro tect hu man rights by tak ing for granted that the leg is lator is not only ra tio nal but also rep re sents "the" sov er eign it self com pletely free of any lim i ta tion. On the con trary, in the fol low ing part, I in tend to ex plicit the forms and lim its of (good) leg is la tion.
III. THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF LEGISLATION
As I had al ready men tioned, the term "leg is la tion" as it is used here is not re stricted to leg is la tors and leg is la tures func tion ing as part of an es tab lished gov ern ment, but applied to any one that makes gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent rules. Ac cord ingly, it in cludes not only leg isla tive as sem blies but also agents or bod ies as sum ing leg is lative pow ers: to draft a Con sti tu tion; to amend or to re form it; to add or mod ify, on one side, and, to ab ro gate or der o gate, on the other, a piece of leg is la tion; to out line an in ter national, re gional or bi lat eral treaty or even an ex ec u tive agreement; to pre pare an ex ec u tive reg u la tion, and so on.
It is clear that ac cord ing to the ideal of the rule of law, we must be gov erned by laws -nómos basileus for the Greeks and lex rex for the Romans-that are for mu lated in gen eral terms, as Cicero said leges legum, 10 to be ap plied gen er ally to all the cases cov ered by them. Hence, the leg is la tive prod uct or re sult must be gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent. How ever, ques tions of the per mis si ble forms and the proper lim its of leg is la tion re main un clear. On that ac count the prob lem that we ex pect to ad dress in this part is cap tured by the two terms of its ti tle: the forms and lim its of leg is la tion. 11 255
Forms
By the forms of leg is la tion I mean the ways in which it may be or ga nized and re al ized. There fore, in this sec tion, I will at tempt to an swer two ques tions: What are the per missi ble vari a tions in the forms of leg is la tion? When has its na ture been so al tered that we are com pelled to speak of an abuse or a per ver sion of the legislative process?
On the one hand, I con sider as per mit ted or proper forms of leg is la tion those leg is la tive prod ucts or re sults that are truly gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent, in depend ently of the agent or body as sum ing leg is la tive pow ers, be cause they are both act ing ac cord ing to the prin ci ples of le gal ra tio nal ity and they are au tho rized to do it. 12 For those rea sons the ac cept able vari a tions of leg is la tion, besides the clear case of a leg is la tive as sem bly en act ing leg is lation, i.e. a gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent law, re gard less its name, in clude:
A) A cons ti tu tio nal as sembly draf ting a Cons ti tu tion, which in tends to go vern or gui de hu man con duct ac cor ding to sha red prin ci ples and pur po ses of the re le vant moral and po li ti cal com mu nity, i.e. the peo ple go ver ned, re gard less of furt her re qui re ments, as long as it guaran tees the hu man rights and de ter mi nes the se pa ration of po wers, and does not le gis la te so met hing impos si ble.
B) A le gis la ti ve as sembly amen ding or re for ming a Cons ti -
tu tion, as long as it con ti nues to be ge ne ral, abs tract, im per so nal and per ma nent, and res pects the hu man rights and the se pa ra tion of po wers, re gard less of furt her re qui re ments such as: a two thirds ma jo rity and/or ra ti fi ca tion by the ma jo rity of sta te le gis la tu res or by the peo ple them sel ves through a cons ti tu tio nal re fe ren dum. C) A le gis la ti ve as sembly ad ding or mo dif ying, on one side, and, abro ga ting or de ro ga ting, on the ot her, a piece of le gis la tion, as long as the re form is ge ne ral, abstract, im per so nal and per ma nent, re gard less of further re qui re ments, and is en tit led to do it or the re is no ex press prohi bi tion, such as abrid ging free dom of speech as the First Amend ment of the Uni ted Sta tes Cons ti tu tion bans. D) A head of a Sta te, usually the exe cu ti ve, out li ning -in a con ven tion with ot her heads of Sta tes or exe cu tives-an in ter na tio nal, re gio nal or bi la te ral treaty or an exe cu ti ve agree ment, which in tends to go vern or gui de hu man con duct ac cor ding to sha red prin ci ples and pur po ses of the re le vant mo ral and po li ti cal com munity, i.e. the sig ning par ties, re gard less of whet her the re are or not furt her re qui re ments such as: a simple ma jo rity or two thirds ma jo rity of the Se na te, a sim ple ma jo rity on both Cham bers of Con gress, and/or ra ti fi ca tion by the ma jo rity of sta te le gis la tu res or by the peo ple them sel ves through a re fe ren dum, as long as it is en tit led to do it and the re is no ex press prohi bi tion, such as ar ti cle 15 of the Me xi can Cons titu tion which bars ex tra di tion trea ties of po li ti cal priso ners or sla ves, and trea ties against the rights and gua ran tees es ta blis hed by it; and, E) An exe cu ti ve -or any ot her branch of go vern mentpre pa ring a re gu la tion, a ge ne ral ac cord or me mo randum to pro vi de its own ad mi nis tra tion or bu reau cracy with some gui de li nes to en for ce a pie ce of le gis la tion, as long as the re gu la tion re mains truly ge ne ral, abs tract, im per so nal and per ma nent, and res pects the hierarchy of laws as it is sub or di na ted to a pie ce of le gisla tion.
On the other hand, I con sider as per verted or im proper forms of leg is la tion those leg is la tive prod ucts or re sults that are not truly gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent, in de pend ently of the agent or body as sum ing leg is la tive 257 pow ers, be cause they ei ther fail to re spect the prin ci ples of le gal ra tio nal ity or were not au tho rized to do it.
The trou ble some case here is that of the so-called "ju dicial leg is la tion", i.e. the rec og ni tion that un der ex cep tional cir cum stances a judge does leg is late -or at least does itin ter sti tially as Ol i ver Wendell Holmes re al ized: 13 "I rec ognize with out hes i ta tion that judges do and must leg is late, but they can do so only in ter sti tially; they are con fined from "mo lar to mo lec u lar mo tions".
Or as Her bert Louis Adoplhus Hart rec og nized, due to the "open tex ture", judges in ev i ta bly have to ex er cise their discre tion as sum ing the role of the leg is la tor and in do ing so they cre ate law in ter sti tially, i.e. leg is lat ing from time to time: 14 "Laws re quire in ter pre ta tion if they are to be ap plied to con crete cases, and once the myths which ob scure the na ture of the ju di cial pro cesses are dis pelled by re al is tic study, it is pat ent… that the open tex ture of law leaves a vast field for a cre ative ac tiv ity which some call leg is la tive".
On this re gard, I will like to state the fol low ing:
1) Jud ges are not aut ho ri zed to le gis la te, i.e. to make law -ius dare-but to apply the ge ne ral rule to par ti cu lar ca ses. 15 2) Jud ges have -as a pri mary and pro per func tionto ad ju di ca te, i.e. to find law ap pli ca ble in or der to sett le dis pu tes about rights and du ties -ius iu di care; 16 and, 3) Jud ges have ine vi tably to as su me ot her se con dary func tions, both pro per and im pro per, in the pro cess of achie ving their pri mary and pro per func tion of ad ju dica ting rights and du ties: 17 a) Jud ges have to in ter pret the law, i.e. to as cri be a mea ning to the rule or prin ci ple to be ap plied -ius di ce re; b) Jud ges, whi le in ter pre ting, have so me ti mes to fill in gaps and to sol ve con tra dic tions, in clu ding con flicts of ru les and co lli sions of prin ci ples, i.e. to co rrect legis la ti ve errors and over sights, by dra wing ana logies in ten ded to de ri ve or to in fer from the ex pli cit part the im pli cit one or even de ci ding which in terpre ta tion fits best; 18 and c) Jud ges have to ar gue, i.e. to pro vi de rea sons to justify their in ter pre ta tion not only as the one that fits best but also as the re qui red one ac cor ding to law and not to their own pre fe ren ces. 19 I do not chal lenge the fact that judges al ways cre ate an in di vid ual norm to the case at hand, e.g. "The rul ing in this case is that x is con demned to pay to y, be cause li a ble of z". Nor that in do ing so the judge some times cre ates a pre cedent, i.e. a cri te ria or model of in ter pre ta tion for fu ture cases, e.g. "Those in the same sit u a tion as x must be condemned to pay to those sim i lar to y, be cause they will also be li a ble of some thing like z".
Let me clar ify that I do con tend, what Fuller la beled as a "ju di cial usur pa tion", 20 i.e. the idea that judges are al lowed in ex cep tional cases to leg is late in ter sti tially as if they were the leg is la tors, i.e. cre ate gen eral, ab stract, im per sonal and per ma nent rules, not the idea that they do some how cre ate law, whether it is an in di vid ual norm or a pre ce dent makes no dif fer ence at all. I even crit i cize the idea that a judge can cre ate law out of the blue. The lat ter is some thing that not even a leg is la tor can do or does, be cause do ing that will rep re sent fail ing to re spect the ex plicit and im plicit lim its of its func tions, as well as the prin ci ples of le gal ra tio nal ity, spe cially ac cord ing to "constitutionalism" where they cannot re strict or vi o late hu man rights and sep a ra tion of powers. On the con trary, judges de rive or in fer from gen eral rules, as well as from gen eral prin ci ples of fairness and equity, an impartial decision to the case before them.
Lim its
By the lim its of leg is la tion I re fer to the (ex plicit and implicit) re stric tions on the fash ion of its or ga ni za tion or re aliza tion. Thus, in this sec tion, I will at tempt to an swer to two ques tions: What kinds of so cial tasks can prop erly be as signed to leg is la tures and other leg is la tive bod ies? What tacit as sump tions un der lie the con vic tion that cer tain problems are in her ently un suited for leg is la tive dis po si tion and should be left to the courts and tribunals?
On the one side, it is clear that the so cial tasks prop erly as signed to leg is la tures and other leg is la tive agents or bod -260 ies, es pe cially due to their rep re sen ta tive na ture, im ply taking po lit i cal de ci sions -ideo log i cal but not nec es sar ily subjec tive-or at least de pend ent to cer tain de gree of po lit i cal con sid er ations, such as whether the elec tor ate agrees or dis agrees with the fi nal product or result, including lawmak ing.
In that sense, po lit i cal de ci sions are taken in re la tion not only to the ques tions on how to gov ern or to guide hu man con duct in ac cor dance to shared prin ci ples and pur poses of the rel e vant moral and po lit i cal com mu nity out of gen eral rules, but also to the quiz zes on how to con trol an other branch of gov ern ment through a bud get ary con strain or even to per se cute a pub lic of fi cial via an im peach ment trial. 21 On the other side, there are func tions un suited to leg is lative dis po si tion such as tak ing tech ni cal de ci sions, which are not nec es sar ily apo lit i cal, but at least they are in depend ent from po lit i cal con sid er ations, such as whether the elec tor ate agrees or dis agrees with the prod uct or re sult, includ ing law-find ing. In fact, de ci sions which im ply that judges ap ply and de rive or in fer form gen eral rules, as well as from gen eral prin ci ples of fair ness and eq uity, an im partial de ci sion to the case be fore them must be tech ni cal, not po lit i cal. In ad di tion, prob lems re lated to what Hart char acter ized as the "open tex ture of lan guage", such as am bi guity and vague ness, as well as gaps and con tra dic tions, includ ing con flicts of rules and col li sions of prin ci ples, are best solved tech ni cally rather than po lit i cally. 22 In that sense, de ci sions aimed at in di vid u als -but not to a class or kind of them-and pre ce dents are a clear limit to leg is la tion. This is true be cause per definitio the first ones are not and can not be gen eral, and, the sec ond ones, although they are stated in more or less broad terms and are 261 given some sort of gen eral ef fects, they are not a piece of leg is la tion com pul sory to ev ery one, both pub lic of fi cials and those gov erned, but a cri te ria or model of in ter pre ta tion for fu ture cases with par tic u lar and con crete fea tures man datory more or less to the pub lic of fi cials but not nec es sar ily to all, in clud ing those gov erned. Fur ther more if the leg is lature dis likes -or does not agree with-the cri te ria or model of in ter pre ta tion (for fu ture cases) set forth by the courts, they can leg is late and even propose a constitutional amendment or reform.
Cer tainly, there are pieces of leg is la tion, from codes to trea ties, which are filled with pur pose ful am bi gu ities and vague pro vi sions, such as those re quir ing "good faith" and "fair prac tice" with out fur ther spec i fi ca tion of the kind of be hav ior ex pected or intended. As Fuller -re fer ring to in ter na tional trea ties but ap pli ca ble to other pieces of legis la tion as well-men tioned: "some is sues are sim ply too touchy to be re solved by agree ment". 23 How ever, let me say that from this, it does not fol low that there is no agree ment at all, but that there is no fur ther over com pre hen sive agreement be yond cer tain point. 24 What's more, in some countries, like in the Mex i can case, the leg is la tures are en ti tled to pro vide in ter pre ta tions to their pieces of leg is la tion (ar ti cle 72 f of the Con sti tu tion).
As laws must be gen eral both in their cre ation and ap plica tion, ac cord ing to the al ter na tive con sti tu tion al ist account that pro tects not only the sep a ra tion of pow ers but also hu man rights, we ar gue that there are prin ci ples anal -262 o gous en force able both to the judge and to the leg is la tor. For in stance, the prin ci ple of im par tial ity, on the part of the judge, i.e. "No one can be judge in his/her own cause", is and must be com ple mented by a twin prin ci ple, on the part of the leg is la tor, i.e. "No one can be leg is la tor in his/her own cause".
I must clar ify that a leg is la tor -due to its clear rep re senta tive na ture-is le git i mated to take po lit i cal de ci sions, includ ing law-mak ing, on be half of ev ery one (im per sonal) and for the com mon ben e fit (gen eral), but not in his/her own name (per sonal) nor for his/her own gain (par tic u lar). Es pecially, in de moc ra cies, leg is la tors can not take that sort of de ci sions nor leg is late on be half of or for the ben e fit of one sole per son -or group-since that will also fail to re spect the prin ci ples not only of gen er al ity and impersonality but also of impartiality and isonomy.
Hence, the prin ci ple must be re stated in the fol low ing terms "No one can be leg is la tor in his/her own cause, nor leg is late on be half of or for the ben e fit of one par tic u lar person -or group".
In those cases, in which this prin ci ple ap pears to be compro mised, be cause it may be said that leg is la tors are leg islat ing for their own cause and on be half of or for the ben e fit of one par tic u lar per son -or group-the best thing to do is to de lay its ef fect un til af ter one elec tion to their po si tion -or to the bene fited one-has passed. To il lus trate the latter point, I must ap peal to some cases: fect un til af ter one con cu rring elec tion to tho se po sitions has pas sed.
3) The de ci sion of the Co lom bian Court of Cons ti tu tio nality, re gar ding whet her it was per mis si ble or not to reform the Co lom bian cons ti tu tion to allow the con se cu tive or im me dia te ree lec tion of the Pre si dent, but wit hout ta king ef fect un til af ter one elec tion to that po si tion has pas sed. 25 In ad di tion, leg is la tion is lim ited by the prin ci ples of (good) le gal ra tio nal ity: 1) clar ity and pre ci sion, im ply avoiding am bi gu ities and vague ness (lin guis tic ra tio nal ity); 2) gener al ity, pub lic ity, irretroactivity or prospectivity -or at least not abu sive of the ex post facto prin ci ple-, co her ent -noncon tra dic tory or non-re dun dant-, and con stancy (sys temic ra tio nal ity); 3) pos si bil ity -no sym bolic law or ef fect-(pragmatic ra tio nal ity); 4) con gru ity -so cio log i cal ef fec tive and eco nom i cally ef fi cient-(te le o log i cal ra tio nal ity); and 5) impar tial ity and isonomy to achieve fair ness and jus tice (eth ical ra tio nal ity).
IV. CONCLUSION: THE QUEST FOR A BON LÉGISLATEUR
By now, le gal phi los o phers have said very much about judges but too lit tle on leg is la tors. To my rec ol lec tion the two com pet ing im ages of judges -the juge loyal and the bon juge-have be come at least three: Hart's Her bert, Dworkin's Her cu les and Ken nedy's Heraclites. 26 264
